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INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE MYTH OF 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Lea Bri/mayer* 
Modern conflict-of-laws scholarship is the victim of a well-inten-
tioned misrepresentation. Proponents of "governmental interest 
analysis" have marketed their theory as a species of legislative inter-
pretation, indeed as the definitive approach to construing legislative 
intent. 1 But while promoted by Brainerd Currie as an antidote to the 
pernicious metaphysical assumptions that afflicted Beale and the 
First Restatement, 2 interest analysis is in fact nothing of the kind. 
Interest analysis merely substitutes one set of metaphysical premises 
for another, leaving the body of conflicts law with a remedy every bit 
as distressing as the disease it was designed to cure. 
Thus far, the interest analysts have been allowed to argue, in ef-
fect, "Our method may seem shortsighted and parochial, but it is not 
the courts' business to second-guess a state legislature." The avowed 
goal is precise, case-by-case implementation of state statutory poli-
cies - loyalty to state policy concerns rather than to "first princi-
ples" such as uniformity or predictability. By neglecting to challenge 
the interest analysts' claims of .fidelity to legislative intent,3 tradition-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, 
University of California at Berkeley; LL.M. 1978, Columbia University. -Ed. I would like to 
thank my research assistant, Brenda Lyons, as well as many colleagues, including David Cur-
rie, Doug Laycock, Bill Powers, Gary Simson, and Russell Weintraub. The Article arose out 
of a very valuable intellectual interchange with Professor Maurice Rosenberg, whose influence 
is evident throughout. 
I. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (1963) [hereinafter cited as 
CURRIE EssA Ys] is the seminal work. "It is explicitly an attempt to determine legislative pur-
poses .... " Id. at 727. "(T]he method I advocate is the method of statutory construc-
tion .... " Id. at 627. In addition, see Currie, The /}isinterested Third State, 28 LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 754, 760-61 (1963); Hancock, "In the Parish of St. Ma,y le Bow, in the Ward 
of Cheap" Choice-of-Law Problems Resolved by Staluto,y Constroclion: The Charitable Testa-
mentary G!ft Cases, 16 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1964). Currie once attempted to distinguish be-
tween "intention" and "purpose." The difference he saw is not altogether clear, although it 
may be the distinction proposed in the text below, between actual and constructive intent. He 
did concede that legislatures did not have any particular intent about how certain cases ought 
to be decided. 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. at 761-62. 
2. Currie, The /}isinlerested Third Stale, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754 (1963), See also 
CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 613: "Almost all constructive writing on conflict of laws in 
this century has been in revolt against this heritage .... " 
3. One author who has disputed these claims is Professor Robert Leflar: 
This process [of statutory construction] involves discovering in a statute something that 
the legislature did not put into it .... Even if called "statutory construction," this is 
really an independent and essentially extraneous process, dependmg on facts not cited in 
the statute itself and in the interests growing out of them ...• The term "statutory con-
392 
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ally minded conflicts theorists have by implication left themselves 
espousing the proposition that a court should decline to honor valid 
legislative wishes. That posture is unnecessarily vulnerable, conced-
ing the interest analysts far too much. This Article attempts to strip 
away the defense of mock judicial deference and to criticize govern-
mental interest analysis on its own merits. 
My critique begins with a brief analysis of the principles underly-
ing the Currie school's calculations of whether a state has an interest 
in having its law applied; it seeks to expose the unarticulated biases 
inherent in that calculus.4 I then argue that Currie's principles can-
not be justified as expressions of actual legislative intent regarding a 
statute's territorial scope.5 Indeed, the discrepancy between govern-
mental interests and actual legislative intent has been overlooked 
only because, in the vast majority of cases, legislatures have no ac-
tual intent on territorial reach with which to contrast Currie's results. 
But without actual legislative endorsement, interest analysis must 
fall back on constructive intent - on a theory that a rational legisla-
ture would, upon reflection, prefer the results of interest analysis to 
those of competing conflicts methodologies. 6 In the most detailed 
discussion of this Article, I take issue with this theory. Interest anal-
ysis is simply too unpredictable and parochial to be a plausible the-
ory of constructive intent.7 Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that 
substantive intent can by itself provide a sufficient basis for conflict 
oflaws decisions.8 I conclude with a short survey of conflicts statutes 
to demonstrate that when legislatures treat conflicts problems explic-
itly, they ordinarily do not follow the interest analysts' approach to 
territorial reach.9 Interest analysis no more reflects actual or con-
structive legislative intentions than did the First Restatement. It is a 
metaphysical system, and a remarkably flawed one at that. 
I. THE CALCULUS OF INTERESTS 
Any study of the method proposed by Brainerd Currie must be-
struction" is no more than a pretentious disguise for application of the court's conflicts 
law. 
Leflar, Choice-of-Law Statutes, 44 TENN. L. REV. 951, 954 (1977). See also Reese, Co,!flicts of 
Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 686 (1963). 
4. See text at notes 10-35 iefra. 
5. See text at notes 36-47 iefra. 
6. See text at notes 48-87 iefra. 
7. See text at notes 48-87 iefra. 
8. See text at notes 88-97 iefra. 
9. See text at notes 100-16 iefra. 
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gin with the concept of a "governmental interest." 10 An "interest'' is, 
essentially, a prim.a facie claim that a state's law should apply. It is 
generally thought, for instance, that a forum's interest will trump the 
interests of other involved states because of the court's duty to follow 
legislative commands. 11 And while other factors may override an 
interest, commentators disagree over when an interest should yield. 
For instance, some authorities believe that it is desirable to mediate 
conflicts between two or more competing interests by reexamining 
those interests. Closer examination may show one interest to be 
weightier than the other, 12 one to be more consistent with modern 
trends in substantive law than the other, 13 or one to be more jeopard-
ized by neglect. 14 But lengthening the process of accommodating 
and implementing those state interests already recognized will not 
remedy all defects inherent in the initial "identification" of interests. 
Among other things, injustice may result precisely because a state 
fails to find an interest; 15 subsequent steps do not remedy this prob-
lem. For this reason, and because the identification of "interests" in 
theory determines whether the legislature would wish to have its law 
applied, "interest" is the key concept in the critical discussion below. 
Whether a state is thought to have an interest in having its law 
applied to a particular case is a function of the multistate elements 
present in a case, the precise statutes involved, and the policies un-
derlying those statutes. These policies can be categorized as protec-
tive, compensatory, and regulatory, for in drawing multistate 
implications from statutes, Currie relied upon their protective, com-
pensatory, and regulatory aspects. His treatment of the married wo-
men's contract cases exemplifies the interest analyst's approach to a 
statute that furthers a protective policy. The court in Milliken v. 
JO. See CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 189. 
11. See, e.g., CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 181-82, 610, 617. 
12. Currie argued that a court should not weigh interests. See id. at 182, 606, 610, 617. 
Apparently, however, he thought balancing was intimated by the Second Reslalemenl ap-
proach, which asked which contacts were "more significant." See also Currie, supra note 2, at 
759 (criticizing Cavers's proposal to weigh interests to decide which is "greater"). 
13. Leflar thought that it was relevant to ask which rule of law was substantively more 
sound. See Leflar, Co,yficls Law: More on Choice-I,y!uencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1584 (1966). See also Weintraub, The Future oJ Choice oJ Law for Torts: Whal Principles 
Should Be Preferred?, 41 LAW & C0NTEMP. PROB. 146, 163 (1977). 
14. Professor Baxter has espoused an approach based on "comparative impairment." See 
Baxter, Choice oJ Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. I (1963). 
15. The parochialism problems which arise when the state fails to find an interest in assist-
ing nonresidents are discussed in the text at notes 64-87 infra. Other problems, which arise 
when a court tries to limit the unpredictable application of forum law under interest analysis, 
are discussed in the text at notes 59-61 infra. 
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Pratt 16 had to choose between a Massachusetts statute invalidating 
married women's agreements to act as guarantors for their husbands' 
debts and a Maine statute that did not; Pratt, the defendant, had 
guaranteed her husband's credit. In an early article, Currie analyzed 
the possible relevance of four multistate elements: the place of con-
tracting, the domicile of the defendant, the domicile of Milliken, the 
merchant who sought to enforce the agreement, and the location of 
the suit. 17 
Currie found the place of contracting irrelevant. 18 Furthermore, 
if suit was brought in Massachusetts, the wife's domicile was the only 
important element. According to Currie, Massachusetts had enacted 
its law invalidating contracts for the protection of Massachusetts 
married women; it had no reason to invalidate an agreement by a 
woman from Maine, which had emancipated its married women. 
"Never mind, for the time being, exactly what we mean by 'Massa-
chusetts' married women - whether citizens, domiciliaries, resi-
dents. For the sake of convenience, until we must decide that 
question, let us say that it is residence in Massachusetts that defines 
the ambit of the state's protective policy." 19 Herein lies the first gen-
eral principle of Currie's analysis: If a state has a protective policy, 
then its interest in applying its law depends upon the residence of the 
defendant.20 State protective policies are designed to benefit resident 
defendants alone.21 
16. 125 Mass. 374 (1878). 
17. Discussed in chapter two of his Selected Essays, Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A 
Study in Co'!flict-o.fLaws Method, in CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 77. 
18. CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 109: "To apply the law of the place of making would 
be to make the result in each case depend upon an irrelevant factor, determined by chance." 
19. Id at 86 (emphasis original). 
20. This principle is illustrated also by Currie's attitude toward guest statutes, which are 
protective laws. See id at 690-742. Objecting to New York's application of the Ontario guest 
statute in a case involving a New York defendant, he wrote, "Ontario has no interest at all in 
the application of its guest statute .... The guest statute expresses a policy for the protection 
of defendants. The defendant here, however, is not a citizen or resident of Ontario, he is a 
citizen of a state that holds him accountable for injuries to his guests." Id at 724. 
21. On several occasions, Currie qualified this rule by saying that Massachusetts should 
also invalidate the contract if the defendant's state invalidated such contracts. See, e.g., id 
at 111-13. This qualification was apparently designed to limit the parochial effects of his the-
ory and to thwart constitutional objections. Yet his compromise does nothing for the woman 
who is not from a state that invalidates married women's agreements; she is still treated differ-
ently from forum residents. Currie's compromise was not recognizing a forum interest in hav-
ing its law applied so much as applying the protective law of the other state. CURRIE ESSAYS, 
supra note I, at 113 (indicating that it is her home law which protects her). He still could not 
imagine that the Massachusetts legislature would care about anyone other than Massachusetts 
women. He also suggested that, even without the qualification deferring to the other state's 
protective law, his parochial plan would be a rational way to maximize interests and would be 
acceptable if "higher authority" need not be consulted. Id at 89. In his subsequent discus-
sions of interests, he often did not mention the qualification. 
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Compensatory interests are the second classification implicit in 
Currie's analytical approach. As we have noted, protective interests 
favor defendants and are keyed to the defendant's residence or dom-
icile. Compensatory interests, in contrast, favor plaintiffs and are 
triggered by the plaintiff's residence. The nature of compensatory 
interests is demonstrated by Currie's treatment of Grant v. McAu-
l!!fe,22 in which an Arizona protective statute competed with a Cali-
fornia compensatory statute. In Grant, a California car had collided 
with another California car in Arizona, and the administrator of a 
deceased driver's estate brought suit in a California court. Under 
Arizona law, no tort suit could begin after the death of the tortfeasor; 
California, however, allowed such actions to survive. The California 
Supreme Court held the California statute applicable and allowed 
the action to proceed to trial. 
Currie applauded this result.2~ Damages for personal injury, he 
argued, are intended to compensate the injured party. The Califor-
. nia statute evidenced concern that if tort law did not provide com-
pensation, the injured person would become a public charge. Thus it 
subordinated the interests of the tortfeasor's estate to the interests of 
the injured person and of the citizens at large who would pay for 
public assistance. As with protective policies, Currie asserted that 
this compensatory policy was intended to benefit only injured resi-
dents.24 
A compensatory statute, favoring the plaintiff in a particular 
case, may of course have effects beyond the confines of that case. 
The price it exacts from the defendant may make the conduct that 
caused the harm unprofitable. If the statute is in fact designed to 
change incentives by making previously profitable conduct too 
costly, it may evidence a regulatory policy as well as a compensatory 
one. Occasionally, protective statutes also regulate conduct; while a 
contributory negligence standard favors defendants, it is also sup-
posed to discourage negligent activity by plaintiffs. Currie found 
these "conduct-regulating" interests - the third class implicit in his 
analysis of legislative policies - to be triggered by territorial con-
22. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). 
23. CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 132. 
24. Id. at 144-45. Although he also said there might be an interest when the plaintiff was 
present in the state at the time of injury, he dropped this suggestion thereafter, presumably 
because it reinforced the "state of wrong" rule. 
Currie applied a similar analysis to cases involving other compensatory statutes, such as 
the New York child support statute in Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). In Haag, he asserted, New York had an interest in applying its law be-
cause the mother and child were New York residents. CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 732. 
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necting factors rather than domiciliary factors. The most significant 
territorial connection with the forum was presence of the com-
plained-of activity, but sometimes one could find a connection in the 
possibility of foreseeable harm within the jurisdiction. 25 
When the sole purpose of the statute is to regulate conduct, its 
scope seems clearly limited to conduct with territorial connections. 
Currie mentioned traffic rules as obvious examples: "We all know 
that the rule of the road varies from place to place. It is perfectly 
apparent that the rule in ·New York is not intended to have any ap-
plication to Saudi Arabia, but is designed solely to regulate traffic on 
the streets and highways of New York."26 He also cited Sunday blue 
laws. Discussing a Georgia case concerning a contract formed in 
Kansas on a Sunday, he argued that the Georgia law invalidating 
Sunday contracts had no rational application to transactions in Kan-
sas: 
Georgia invalidates domestic Sunday contracts because (A) the crimi-
nal laws of the state prohibit the pursuit of one's ordinary calling on 
that day, and (B) the courts have decided that, in addition to the penal 
sanctions provided by statute, a contract made in violation of the pro-
hibition should be made unenforceable. But the Georgia court would 
hardly have taken the position that the parties, in entering into this 
transaction in Kansas, had committed an offense against the criminal 
laws of Georgia.27 
As even Currie recognized, the reason Georgia would not want its 
Sunday blue laws to apply to contracts made in Kansas is that expec-
tations are important in governmental efforts to influence conduct, 
and expectations are largely territorial. 
Because statutes embodying only regulatory policies are so obvi-
ously territorial, their conflict of laws implications are rarely liti-
gated.28 Regulatory policies, however, are important in conflicts 
25. Frequently in the text below, and solely for the purpose of convenience, it will be 
stated simply that conduct-regulating rules apply to activities within the state, and the qualifi-
cation "or causing foreseeable harm there" will be omitted. 
26. CURRIE EsSAY, supra note l, at 58. 
27. Id at 59-60 (footnotes omitted). 
28. One interesting example, however, is People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 
311 P.2d 480 (1957). California police had confiscated an automobile used for transporting 
narcotics, and the Texas mortgagor sought its return. Under California law the owner of a 
security interest had to inquire into the debtor's character in order to preserve that interest if 
the security was confiscated. Under Texas law, however, no such inquiries were necessary. 
The California court held forum law inapplicable. 
In the absence of a plain legislative direction to the contrary, ... the statute cannot rea-
sonably be interpreted as requiring such investigation when the sales are financed in other 
states and the vehicles are taken to California, not only without the knowledge of those 
financing the sales, but in violation of express contractual prohibitions. . ... A person 
financing the sale of an automobile in Texas for use exclusively in that state will look to 
the laws of Texas for the determination of his rights and duties. 
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litigation because they are oftenjoinec;l with compensatory or protec-
tive policies in a single statute. Regulatory policies are triggered by 
territorial connecting factors, and protective or compensatory poli-
cies by domiciliary ones. The difficult issue, therefore, is what to do 
when a fact situation triggers one of the interests behind a statute but 
not the other. What, in other words, should be done when conduct 
within the state injures a nonresident or when a resident is hurt by 
conduct outside the state? Apparently, the interest analysts would 
answer that either the compensatory or the conduct-regulating inter-
est is a sufficient reason to apply forum law.29 Thus, if the plaintiff is 
a resident or the tortious conduct occurred within the state, the state 
has an interest in having its statute applied. This is apparently the 
reason Currie would have allowed a New Yorker to benefit from 
New York negligence law even though the accident occurred out of 
the state: the New York compensatory interest was sufficient.30 Var-
ious cases purporting to apply interest analysis are consistent with 
this view,31 and it has been explicitly urged by at least one commen-
tator.32 
Implicit in this calculus of interests are three discernible biases: 
pro-resident, pro-forum-law, and pro-recovery. The pro-resident 
bias results from the assumption that protective and compensatory 
policies of the forum can be invoked only by forum residents. Resi-
dents thus have the best of both worlds: they can claim the benefits 
of these policies in multistate cases without incurring the corre-
sponding costs. The pro-recovery and pro-forum-law biases stem 
from the assumption that when a statute embodies several policies, 
any one of them may trigger the finding of an "interest." Thus, a 
forum statute that embodies regulatory and compensatory policies 
gives rise to a governmental interest if the plaintiff is a resident of the 
48 Cal. 2d at 598-99, 311 P.2d at 482 (citations omitted). 
29. At least, when dealing with statutes evidencing both types of policies they seem content 
merely to cite one as justification for a finding of "interest." There seems to be no sentiment 
that if a court finds a compensatory policy, it should ask whether there are other policies 
involved and whether they are satisfied. See notes 59-61 1i?fra and accompanying text. 
30. See CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 725. 
31. See, e.g., Brown v. Market Dev., Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 322 N.E.2d 367 (1974) (act 
providing civil damages held applicable where activity occurred within borders, even if non-
resident defrauded); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976) 
(allowing unlimited wrongful death recovery on a deterrence theory); Kilberg v. Northeast 
Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (allowing unlimited wrongful 
death recovery on a compensation theory). 
32. "For purposes of interest analysis, a rule of substantive law should be presumed to 
reflect all legitimate policies that it could possibly serve." Sedler, T/1e Governmental /11/eres/ 
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 199 (1977) 
(emphasis original). See also Note, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76-78 (1967) (state 
has an interest when one of a number of alternative grounds is satisfied). 
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forum or if the offensive conduct occurred there.33 This splintering 
of policies increases the likelihood that the state will have an interest 
and predisposes the method toward forum law. Furthermore, it cre-
ates a bias toward recovery because pro-recovery statutes are the 
most likely to serve several different policies, namely compensatory 
and regulatory ones. The plaintiff's power to choose the forum con-
tributes further to the pro-recovery bias; interest analysis permits dif-
ferent courts to reach different results by honoring their respective 
states' interests, and the plaintiff naturally selects the most favorable 
forum. 
These biases do not bother the interest analysts too much, for the 
abiding purpose of their theory is case-by-case implementation of 
state policies. For members of the Currie school, deference to the 
laws of other jurisdictions and even-handed treatment of nonresi-
dents do not warrant disregard of state substantive goals. 34 Since 
they think "interests" are the perfect embodiment of legislative in-
tent, the sacrifice of mundane system-coordinating concerns does not 
distress them. And if their premise is truly sound, their conclusion 
may be compelling;35 if interest analysis really holds the key to legis-
lative intent, the sacrifice is not only worthwhile but arguably neces-
sary. 
II. INTEREST ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Why do the interest analysts claim that their theory satisfies legis-
lative desires? Saying it's so doesn't make it so. Most traditionally 
minded theorists would agree that any explicit legislative instruc-
tions should be followed;36 but the problem is what to do when the 
face of the statute is silent. What sort of evidence would interest 
analysts use to justify their inferences? 
Currie did not envision extensive reliance upon legislative his-
tory. Many states do not even publish legislative histories, and those 
that do rarely document the legislators' views on territorial reach. 
Currie reached his solutions by generalizing about classes of statutes 
33. This must include conduct which causes foreseeable harm within the jurisdiction. See 
note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
34. Currie conceded that uniformity and protection of expectations were desirable, CUR-
RIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 100-01, 186-87, but claimed that they did not justify substantial 
sacrifices of substantive interests. Id. at 118 (only where substantive policies weak). 
35. One objection that might still be made is that many substantive law doctrines are judge 
made. If legislatures may specify the territorial reach of statutes as they please (within consti-
tutional limits), courts should be equally free with common law. The policies are judicially 
created, and could be modified or overruled by later courts. 
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS§ 6(1) (1971). 
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(married women's contract laws, for instance), apparently assuming 
that unless otherwise indicated in the statute the policies behind all 
such statutes could be treated as identical.37 This assumption alone 
should make us suspicious about whether Currie was deducing true 
legislative intent, which one might expect to vary from state to state. 
It suggests that Currie's principles of inference were rather a product 
of his own normative beliefs about how far certain policies ought to 
reach. 
Two pieces of evidence bolster this suspicion. The first is the 
willingness of Currie and his followers to criticize legislative choice 
when it contradicts the principles of interest analysis. Currie, for ex-
ample, strenuously opposed e.ff orts to change the result in Grant v. 
McAul!ffe38 by legislation, writing that "a more mischievous piece of 
legislation . . . would be difficult to imagine."39 This is a strange 
posture for one who criticized traditional analysis for disregarding 
legislative preference. Currie apparently felt that legislatures should 
not participate in choice-of-law problems by expressing their wishes 
about the territorial reach of their statutes, at least not by enacting 
traditional rules. 
[T]he California Legislature, and all others, would do well to avoid 
enacting choice-of-law rules in general. This is intended as a very nar-
row statement. It does not mean that legislatures should not concern 
themselves with problems of conflict of laws. There is a body of highly 
desirable legislation in the field. The statement means only that the 
legislature would be well advised not to express its will concerning 
conflict-of-laws problems in the form of traditional choice-of-law rules 
40 
Since Currie did favor legislative action when it coincided with his 
views,41 what mattered to him was not whether the courts or the leg-
islature should decide territorial reach, but whether the end result 
was application of interest analysis. Moreover, the interest analysts' 
willingness to criticize actual legislative choice manifests a convic-
tion that a given statute has a "natural" territorial reach. This is, of 
37. Currie did acknowledge that substantive law specialists should have the final say. 
CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 592. But unless legislators give some indication of their 
wishes, there is nothing for such specialists to go on, and the courts facing conflicts problems 
are left speculating about types of statutes. 
38. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). 
39. CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 131 n.18. 
40. Id at 170. This seems particularly anomalous given that one supposed benefit of inter-
est analysis is that it "invites legislative revision" if courts err. Id at 604, 728. Currie was also 
opposed to legislatures adopting interstate treaties, on the ground that trading away the rights 
of state citizens was troubling. Id at 121-22, 190 n.5. Apparently their role was to be limited 
to specifying the substantive policies involved, and letting the "natural law" of interest analysis 
take its course. 
41. Id at 171, 114. 
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course, the familiar Bealean metaphysics in a new garb - although 
the content of the a priori principles has changed, they are a priori 
principles nonetheless. 
The second piece of evidence that betrays the value-laden pos-
ture of interest analysis is Currie's promotion of the concept of "in-
terest" as a constitutional test. Borrowing from Supreme Court 
decisions that chanced to use the word "interest"42 before it became 
a term of art, Currie argued that the Constitution would be off ended 
if and only if a court applied the law of a state without an interest.43 
The significance of using the same term both to signify actual intent 
and to serve as a constitutional test is that the tests for actual intent 
and constitutionality are thereby equated. This jeopardizes the sta-
tus of "interests" as actual intent, since to make actual intent disposi-
tive of constitutionality would be to allow a state legislature to apply 
its law in its courts whenever it so desired. The legislature would 
need only to specify its intent clearly to create an "interest" and sat-
isfy the Constitution. Indeed, since state courts are the final inter-
preters of state policies in our federal system,44 a test of actual intent 
would leave no federal question and, a fortiori, no jurisdictional ba-
sis for Supreme Court review.45 
But Currie clearly did not intend to repose such awesome discre-
tion in the hands of state legislators when he described his constitu-
tional test. He devoted a complete article to a discussion of the 
constitutional limits that interest analysis puts on legislative author-
42. Currie cites, for instance, Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers 
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939). CURRIE EssAYS, supra note 1, at 145 n.64. 
43. See CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 188-282. 
44. The Supreme Court has no· authority to correct state court errors in state law, even 
when there is an alternate federal basis for review. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 590, 635 (1875). 
45. Another area in which interest analysis has served to confuse constitutional issues is 
full faith and credit, in which it is sometimes argued that a second state ought not to have to 
enforce the first state's judgments when to do so would be contrary to the second state's "inter-
ests." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 419 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Brief of the Solicitor General's Office in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., cert. granted, 
Docket No. 79-116, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (Nov. 26, 1979). Ordinarily, the second state's "inter-
ests" are irrelevant with regard to enforcement of sister-state judgments; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 
210 U.S. 230 (1907) (no defense that gambling contract would have been held void as contrary 
to public policy); Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) ("considerations of 
policy in the forum which would defeat a suit ... are not involved"). See also Cheatam, Res 
Judicata and Full Faith and Credit, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 336 (1944); R. CRAMTON, D. 
CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 681 (2d ed. 1975) (state may not invoke public policy 
as a defense to enforcement of judgments). 
If this test were adopted, and if "interest" is understood as actual intent, then, as with 
choice-of-law problems there would be no federal question. It is possible that proponents of 
this test mean "interest" as Justice Stone did; see cases cited in note 42 supra. The confusion of 
terms is extremely unfortunate and use of the word might best be abandoned. 
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ity regarding choice oflaw.46 Thus, either he was intending to create 
a second constitutional type of interest analysis - and if he had such 
an independent theory he never developed it in print47 - or else 
"interests" do not involve actual intent at all. 
Interest analysis must therefore be some species of constructive 
intent: a calculus of a _priori principles that a court may fall back on 
when the legislature gives no guidance. Only if this conclusion is 
correct do interest analysts have a normative base from which to crit-
icize conflicts statutes - for one's approach to constructive intent 
would probably be to choose what one finds to be the most coherent 
and convincing theory. This interpretation forces the interest ana-
lysts to concede that they reason from a _priori assumptions, but at 
least it explains how they are able to .draw inferences from a seem-
ingly silent statute, like rabbits from a hat. 
Ill. CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT 
The law contains many maxims of statutory construction; penal 
laws, for instance, are supposed to be narrowly construed, as are stat-
utes in derogation of the common law. If interest analysis is a plau-
sible way of thinking about conflict-of-laws problems, it should be 
able to join those maxims as a basis for making inferences when no 
actual intent has been manifested. To avail itself of this opportunity, 
however, it must be convincing on its own merits, for it no longer has 
the legislative imprimatur. In this Section, I hope to demonstrate 
that the features that have made interest analysis unpalatable to 
many commentators - in particular, its unpredictability and paro-
chialism - also leave it unconvincing as a species of constructive 
intent. 
A. Unpredictability 
Opponents of interest analysis have frequently objected that the 
theory allows unpredictable results:48 that persons who act in reli-
ance on one state's laws may be unfairly surprised by application of 
another's. One cause of this unpredictability is the assumption that 
46. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the 
Judicial Fune/ion, 26 u. CHI. L. REV. 9, 43-44, 75-76 (1958), reprinted in CURRIE ESSAYS, supra 
note 1, at 232-33, 271. 
47. His constitutional discussion follows and refers back to the nonconstitutional discus-
sion, without offering a second definition of "interest." Bui see note 21 supra. 
48. See, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws -A Reply lo Professor 
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 463, 503-04 (1960) (interest analysis too "ad hoc"); Reese, 
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972) (rules allow predictability, 
an obvious benefit, but "approach" does not). 
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when a statute evidences both a regulatory policy and a compensa-
tory or protective policy, either would suffice to justify application of 
forum law.49 Thus, a statute that embodies a strong regulatory pol-
icy together with a compensatory policy may be applied on the 
ground that the plaintiff is a forum resident, a fact that the defendant 
might well have been unable to ascertain at the time of conduct. 
This is problematic, since in enacting a regulatory statute a legisla-
ture manifests a belief that most people will change their behavior in 
contemplation of the law. It seems unjust to apply such a law to 
persons who could have had no notice of the applicable standards, 
since the legislature could not have expected them to change their 
conduct to conform. The resulting unfairness can be demonstrated 
by two hypothetical situations. 
Dram-shop acts are statutes that prohibit the sale of liquor to 
inebriates; some states have interpreted them also to authorize recov-
ery of civil damages from the tavern owner if the inebriate negli-
gently injures someone later. 50 It seems clear under interest analysis 
that dram-shop acts, so interpreted, embody both regulatory and 
compensatory policies. The compensatory policy seems implicit in 
.the reasoning courts have used to justify imputing civil liability.51 
The regulatory policy is evident both because the statutes make sale 
of liquor to inebriates illegal and because presumably anyone, resi-
dent or nonresident, could sue a tavern owner who made such a sale 
within the state. 52 
If either of the two policies is a sufficient basis for applying a 
dram-shop act, then civil liability is appropriate whenever the sale 
occurs within the state or a state resident is injured. Interest analysis 
would thus seem to imply that if while on vacation in a state with no 
dram-shop act, a forum resident is hit by an auto careening out of a 
local bar's parking lot, then he may return home, sue, and recover 
from the tavern owner. There may be interest analysts who would 
49. See text at notes 29-32 supra. 
50. See, e.g., the statutes involved in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post, 
43 Ill. 2d l, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969). 
51. See Vesley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). But see 
Hamon v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969). The reasoning in Bern-
hard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
859 (1976), which relied upon the plaintiff's California residence, strongly suggests that the 
California dram shop act as extended by Vesley demonstrated an interest in resident plaintiffs. 
52. But see Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d l, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969). 
Interest analysts cannot explain nonresident recovery under dram-shop acts by compensa-
tory policies. Rather the explanation must be that it is desirable to discourage all sales of this 
sort, since the tavern owner had no way of knowing that a mere resident would be injured. 
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not flinch at this result, since the forum has an "interest" in seeing its 
plaintiff compensated. These theorists would not mind that the tav-
ern owner was surprised by application of forum law, since state 
courts are not in business to take pity on dismayed nonresidents, but 
rather to do as their legislature bids. The legislative command, pre-
sumably, is "Thou shalt compensate forum residents." 
A second hypothetical, however, indicates that residents, too, 
may be trapped by the interest analysts' logic. Assume that the fo-
rum legislature has learned that installing a special safety guard 
would reduce the number of accidents caused by power lawn 
mowers. It orders manufacturers to install the guard on all new 
mowers and provides that noncompliance shall be negligence per se. 
A resident manufacturer diligently complies when manufacturing 
lawn mowers to be sold within the state. The safety guard is expen-
sive, however, and he decides not to put himself at a competitive 
disadvantage by installing them on mowers he manufactures for sale 
and use in other states. "After all," he reasons, "my state legislature 
would have no desire to regulate my sales in other jurisdictions. 
That's interstate commerce."53 Will the forum nevertheless apply 
the negligence per se provision if the person injured in an out-of-
state accident turns out, coincidentally, to be a resident? It is un-
likely that an interest analyst scholar or a court would go so far. But 
if not, why not? 
Traditional theory would have no problem with this case, since 
one of its goals was predictability, and a foreseeability test would 
preclude the law's application to situations where reliance upon an-
other state's law was this likely. Interest analysts, however, are not 
noted for their fondness for foreseeability tests.54 They would prob-
ably prefer something other than an across-the-board foreseeability 
test to explain why the supposed compensatory policy should not be 
honored. The interest analysts might, for instance, assert that when 
53. But cf. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (statute penalizing sale of shipping of 
unripe citrus fruit valid as applied to interstate commerce, despite argument that state had no 
valid concern for health of persons in other states). See also Brown v. Market Dev., Inc., 41 
Ohio Misc. 57, 322 N.E.2d 367 (1974). In some cases, a legislature may desire to prohibit any 
manufacture within the state, regardless of the place of sale. In the hypothetical example this 
seems unlikely and the manufacturer's inference seems reasonable. The rationale for Brown 
was that fraud within the state remained fraud regardless of the fact that it was directed 
against outsiders: The rationale in Sligh was that the state had a right to protect the reputation 
of its citrus products. 
54. Currie, as noted earlier, did concede predictability to be a virtue, but did not find that 
it warranted sacrificing substantive interests. See note 34 supra. One commentator who has 
emphasized both analysis of interests and foreseeability is Professor Russell Weintraub. R. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 208-10 (1971). For Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations, see Leflar, supra note 13. 
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a statute has a significant regulatory purpose, then the statute is not 
designed to be triggered by domiciliary factors, except perhaps when 
the plaintiffs residence is known at the time of conduct. In other 
words, satisfaction of the regulatory policy would be a necessary pre-
condition to assertion of the concurrent compensatory interest. 
No doubt, this accommodation to foreseeability would be an im-
provement. It could, furthermore, be readily subsumed under either 
a "comparative impairment" or a "moderate and restrained interpre-
tation" approach to interest analysis.55 But interest analysts who 
find themselves sympathetic to such an accommodation should ask 
whether a more radical revision is not in order. In particular, this 
strategy suggests that there are dangers· in merely spotting a compen-
satory interest in a case with a resident plaintiff and then applying 
forum law. A concern with foreseeability makes it important to ask 
whether the statute does not also embody a regulatory policy and, if 
it does, whether that policy also gives rise to an interest. 
It is easy to think of situations where this question should have 
been asked. With married women's contract statutes, it seems rea: 
sonable to impute to the legislature an awareness that merchants 
would not enter into unenforceable contracts. It also seems reason-
able to assume that the legislature deliberately intended to discour-
age merchants from the overreaching that such contracts were 
conclusively presumed to demonstrate. In fact, many of the statutes 
that interest analysts call protective or compensatory alter incentives 
in a way that suggests that the legislature was aware of, and probably 
approved of, their regulatory effects.56 Treating married women's 
contract statutes as protective rather than regulatory seems arbitrary 
- they are both. Limiting concern to a statute's protective aspects is 
reminiscent of the Bealean system's arbitrary process of characteriza-
tion, which Currie deplored. 57 
Moreover, recognizing that satisfaction of a regulatory purpose is 
a necessary condition to application of a law with both regulatory 
55. See articles cited in notes 12-14 supra. 
However, it would be preferable to accommodate foreseeability in the initial stages of in-
terest determination rather than merely taking a sober second look once a conflict was identi-
fied. If the foreseeability test is delayed until this latter stage, it may never be brought to bear 
since the other state may not have an "interest" under Currie's definitions.· 
56. Spendthrift trust statutes may influence conduct, but see Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 
Or. I, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); so also may vicarious liability statutes for loan of automobiles, 
which also have the compensatory purpose of providing a solvent defendant, see Young v. 
Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (upholding application of New York vicarious liability law after 
foreseeability analysis); Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 337, 143 
A. 163, 164 (1928) (vicarious liability statute provides incentive to person renting vehicle to 
rent only to competent and careful drivers). 
57. CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note l, at 133. 
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policies and compensatory or protective policies means that, for such 
statutes, domiciliary factors are completely irrelevant. The reason is 
that interest analysts seem to feel that the -regulatory purpose is also 
a sufficient condition.58 If this is true, then Currie's theory has made 
significant concessions to territorialism, which emphasized predict-
ability and looked ordinarily to the places where the conduct at issue 
occurred while disregarding unpredictable domiciliary factors. Re-
turning to the problem of dram-shop acts, and to an actual case de-
cided according to Currie's principles, it is clear that treating the 
regulatory interest as both necessary and sufficient would require 
significant departures from the Ct;irrie school's analysis. 
The case is Bernhard v. Harrah's Cfub.59 In Bernhard, a Nevada 
casino owner sold liquor to a patron who then drove into California 
and collided with a Californian on a motorcycle. In using interest 
analysis to apply the California dram-shop act, the California 
Supreme Court emphasized the plaintitrs California residence, as 
well as the foreseeability of application of California law. The Court 
found that the California statute embodied a regulatory policy and 
that "[d]efendant by the course of its chosen commercial practice has 
put itself at the heart of California's regulatory interest, namely to 
prevent tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously 
intoxicated persons who are likely to act in California in the intoxi-
cated state."60 
Given such a finding, however, it is difficult to see the relevance 
of the plaintitrs California residence or even the California location 
of the accident. All of the facts that triggered the regulatory interest 
would also be present if the patron had happened to collide with a 
nonresident in California - or, for that matter, with a Nevada resi-
dent in Nevada. Perhaps the answer is that both regulatory and 
compensatory interests must be present before a court applies forum 
law: recovery only if a resident plaintiff is struck by an inebriate 
driving foreseeably through California. But this rule would prevent 
application of California law where the sale and accident occur 
there, but a nonresident is hurt. It is hard to believe that the interest 
analysts would wish that result, especially since the California stat-
58. See text at notes 29-32 supra. 
59. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). 
60. 16 Cal. 3d at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. One possible test to explain 
this result, which would match the rationale fairly well, while avoiding the problems oullined 
in the text, would be to ·ask whether there was a foreseeable injury within California, disre-
garding the actual residence of the plaintiff. This probably places too much emphasis on fore-
seeability and location of the accident, and too little on "compensatory" interests to please the 
interest analysts. 
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ute was presumably intended to regulate all sales inside the state by 
making such sales illegal.61 
These examples illustrate some basic points about the value of 
predictability. First, predictability is crucial where the statute regu-
lates conduct. If a state court believes that its state's statutes can be 
triggered by the location of conduct, it imbues the statute with a reg-
ulatory purpose. All unforeseeable applications should then be fore-
closed. Second, if there is no way of determining in advance 
whether particular conduct will be covered by a statute, residents 
and nonresidents alike are put to a difficult choice between forgoing 
conduct that may later tum out to have been permissible and risking 
sanctions. This is the typical "vagueness" problem: a statute with 
uncertain boundaries discourages permissible conduct if people are 
aware of the possible penalties. And if they are unaware of the pen-
alties because the possibility of applying the statute seems too re-
mote, then application surprises individuals afte:i; the fact. 62 Third, it 
is simply inefficient to govern activity through, the in terrorem effect 
of overly broad laws. Regulations that are applied on an unpredict-
able basis impose costs that cannot be justified by social necessity, 
since by hypothesis they discourage conduct needlessly. The addi-
tional cost of lawnmower safety shields illustrates this inefficiency. 
Surely all concerned are better off if there is a predictable basis for 
deciding which lawnmowers need shields: the forum obtains its safe 
product; people in other jurisdictions can buy cheaper lawnmowers; 
and manufacturers are not put to the cost of installing shields on all 
mowers.63 
61. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). See also Johnson v. Spider 
Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976). 
62. See Amsterdam, The Voidjor-Vagueness .Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 67 (1960). 
It is an inadequate response to say that in a mobile society like our own, application of any 
state's law is foreseeable. This position would require every individual in the United States to 
ascertain and conform his conduct to the most stringent of the fifty states' laws, regardless of 
whether there is any apparent connection between that state and the conduct. It would give 
any state the right to regulate any conduct it wished merely by announcing that it intended its 
law to apply. The problem is reminiscent of the fourth amendment test of"reasonable expec-
tations of privacy" established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The test is not 
only one of actual expectations, since the government might condition expectations by an-
nouncing a far-reaching wiretap program, just as a state might declare an intent to apply its 
law to all cases tried in its courts. Instead, it includes normative elements of what an individ-
ual ought to have to expect. See Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 n.5 (1979). See also 
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 47874 (Minn. Aug. 19, 1979), cert. granted, No. 79-983, 48 
U.S.L.W. 3535 (1980) (finding that automobile insurance companies accept the risk that in-
sured may be subject to the law of states other than where the policy was written); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 48 U.S.L.W. 4079 (1980) (insufficient contacts for personal 
jurisdiction that automobile sold by defendants would predictably be driven into other states). 
63. The forum with the plaintiff-favoring rule may be able to effectuate its policies without 
making concessions to other states, although this would still leave the problem of surprising 
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A second objection to the interest analysts' methodology is its 
parochialism, for interest analysis assumes that protective and com-
pensatory policies are intended to benefit residents alone. The con-
sequences of such an assumption are scarcely even-handed. For 
example, suppose the forum has an automobile guest statute - one 
requiring a passenger to demonstrate reckless or willful misconduct 
in order to recover from a host driver. Interest analysis holds that in 
a negligence action brought by a passenger who is a resident of the 
forum, a nonresident driver cannot claim the benefit of forum law 
and require a showing of reckless or willful misconduct. If, however, 
the nonresident had been the passenger and the resident had been 
driving, the forum would have an "interest" in applying its guest 
statute. The out-of-stater must pay if he is the driver but cannot 
collect if he is the passenger. 
Limiting the reach of protective and compensatory statutes to 
precisely those cases where they benefit residents can lead to other 
obnoxious results. Suppose, for example, that state A has a statute of 
frauds provision: according to interest analysis, it was designed to 
protect the residents of A. Anderson, a merchant from state A, con-
tracts with Becker from state .B; the contract does not satisfy A's stat-
ute of frauds, but under the law of .B it would be binding. Suppose 
Anderson wants to know if the contract is valid in state A. An inter-
est analyst could not give a straight answer. The contract could be 
either valid or invalid since A's "interest" in having its statute of 
frauds applied depends upon which party is seeking to enforce the 
contract. If Anderson is suing Becker, then A has no interest in sup-
plying a protective defense. If, on the other hand, Becker sues An-
derson, state A will have an interest in asserting its statute of frauds 
on his behalf. State A has, in e.ff ect, given its residents the power to 
forum defendants. Otherwise all jurisdictions might achieve their goals better by specifying 
the law governing each case. Furthermore, although Currie disparaged the search for uni-
formity of result as comparable to a psychological need to make all substantive laws identical, 
precisely the opposite is true. Diversity of laws is protected when one state cannot undercut 
another's rules of conduct. If unlimited forum-shopping were allowed, only states with plain-
tiff-favoring rules would be able to enforce their standards. 
Currie pointed out that, even if uniformity were important, no state could unilaterally at-
tain it. See CURRIE EssAYS, supra note 1, at 178-79. A state might sacrifice its interests only to 
have other states selfishly pursue their own. This demonstrates an important function that 
documents such as the Restatement should, ideally, fulfill. By coordinating expectations 
through suggesting voluntary compliance with known standards, the Restatement could induce 
cooperation by making it more likely that other states will reciprocate. As Schelling has ar-
gued, where all parties stand to gain through cooperation, but have no mutually binding way 
to agree, it may be sufficient that a third party suggest a compromise which focuses the neces-
sary coordination. See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
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bind parties from out of state to a contract without being bound 
themselves. 64 
In other situations, faithful adherence to interest analysis would 
require a court to browse through the laws of the states involved in 
the controversy to pick the one that best served the resident party. 
Assume that Anderson is injured by a toy designed and manufac-
tured by Billings in state B. Anderson thinks Billings was negligent 
in designing the product. An A statute provides tort compensation 
for damages from negligent manufacture, which has been inter-
preted to include defective design. Does A have an interest in hav-
ing its law applied? As in the previous example, the answer must be 
"it depends." If B law excludes recovery for defects in design, then 
A has an interest in securing compensation for Anderson under its 
own law, for A's law appears to have a compensatory purpose that 
makes it applicable to help Anderson. But if B is a strict liability 
state with no exclusion for design defects, A's interest would vanish 
since it is no longer to Anderson's advantage that A law apply.65 In 
comparison to strict liability, a negligence system appears designed 
to protect manufacturers, and in this case the manufacturer is from 
out of state. "Interest" under the Currie approach amounts to an 
"interest" in getting the best deal possible for the resident party by 
choosing the most favorable law.66 
The difficulty with Currie's approach is not its reference to domi-
ciliary factors. If a state declared that its products liability law ap-
64. This bears a superficial resemblance to the Uniform Commercial Code statute-of-
frauds provision, which makes a contract enforceable only against the party who signed the 
writing. That rule, however, has an obvious evidentiary explanation. 
65. Or at least some courts have so reasoned when forced to choose between forum negli-
gence law and a strict liability law of the state of manufacture. See, e.g., Foster v. Day & 
Zimmerman, 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974). 
66. Selective browsing through the statute books and case reports, to compile the most 
advantageous package for the resident party, is implausible given the factual assumptions un-
derlying protective statutes. Legislatures enact guest statutes to prevent fraudulent claims 
against defendant drivers and their insurers. These statutes codify the legislative determina-
tion that host/guest claims are so likely to be fabricated that the forum should not honor them 
without proof of gross negligence. Currie assumed that the legislature would want a guest 
statute to benefit resident drivers only; if the driver was from a state without a guest statute, 
Currie would allow a resident plaintiff to recover. See text at note 30 supra. But it is not 
reasonable to believe that claims against nonresident drivers are less likely to be fabricated 
than claims against resident drivers. Interest analysis thus seems to impute to the guest statute 
state's legislature the rather cynical position that its courts should enforce fraudulent claims 
when the defendant is a nonresident. Since similar legislative determinations underlie other 
protective statutes (married women's laws or the statute of frauds, for instance), sensitive anal-
ysis of legislative history might lead courts to apply such statutes in all cases involving a forum 
cause of action, not just those with resident defendants. This solution would be akin to the 
traditional one of characterizing the issue as procedural. In the alternative, a court might limit 
application of the forum's guest statute out of some sentiment, such as comity, unrelated to 
what the court perceived as the substantively appropriate result. 
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plied to all injured residents, the problem outlined above would be 
avoided. Either there would be an interest or there would not, and it 
would not depend upon comparison with other states' laws. But 
such a statute would not always benefit forum residents. It would 
benefit them in some cases and harm them in others. Thus, such a 
rational statute is irreconcilable with the superficially plausible syllo-
gism that seems to underlie Currie's approach: if a statute is 
designed to benefit forum residents, it should be applied only when a 
resident will benefit. 
Why should a court accept the suggestion that protective and 
compensatory policies should be applied only when a forum resident 
will benefit? The blatant parochialism evidenced by these examples 
surely imposes costs. It jeopardizes a principle essential to smooth 
functioning of federal systems: treating nonresidents as fairly as res-
idents. 67 It also raises difficult problems of whether an individual 
ought to be able to get a change of law by deliberately acquiring a 
67. Some courts have justifiably balked at carrying this parochialism to its ultimate conclu-
sion. See, e.g., Frommer v. Hilton Hotels, Intl., Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 
N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), where a New York court rejected an argument 
that England had no interest in applying its comparative negligence rule merely because the 
plaintiff was from New York and the defendant from England. While denying that English 
law served a regulatory purpose, the Frummer court nevertheless gave the New Yorker- the 
benefit of the more lenient standard of recovery: 
With regard to the compensatory policy of the comparative negligence statute, it may be 
contended that, since the plaintiff is a New York resident, England might well prefer New 
York law, which would benefit its domiciliary in this case. But it is difficult to conceive of 
England having such a parochial viewpoint. The statute by its language is not limited to 
any particular class of plaintiffs. 
Concededly, the New York court may have been influenced in its decision to apply English 
law broadly by the New York residence of the beneficiary even though it purported to be 
analyzing English interests. 
In Mccrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), however, a 
District of Columbia court rejected a similar argument calling for application of Maryland's 
privity-of-contract doctrine to a Maryland resident. "The rule in the District," the court ex-
plained, "dispensing with the requirements of privity in implied warranty cases, is for the 
benefit and protection of all who buy in the District, not for residents of the District alone." 
248 A.2d at 921. q: Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. I (D.R.!. 1972) (where the 
court found the interests of the state of plaintiffs residence and the state of defendant's princi-
pal place of business equivalent and therefore applied the "better" rule of law). The obvious 
problem with the Frummer strategy is that if there is an interest when the plaintiff is a resident, 
but we prefer not to treat nonresidents differently, then the law is applicable to all cases. 
Another way of avoiding limiting compensatory statutes is by discovering a simultaneous 
regulatory interest. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. 
Rptr. 106 (1974), in which a resident of Zacatecas, Mexico, was killed in an automobile acci-
dent in California by a California resident. The California Supreme Court held that Califor-
nia had an interest in applying its unlimited recovery rules, because unlimited damages 
deterred negligent driving: 
It is manifest that one of the primary purposes of a state in creating a cause of action in 
the heirs for the wrongful death of the decedent is to deter the kind of conduct within its 
borders which wrongfully takes life .... It is also abundantly clear that a cause of action 
for wrongful death without any limitation as to the amount of recoverable damages 
strengthens the deterrent aspect of the civil sanction .... Therefore when the defendant 
is a resident of California and the tortious conduct giving rise to the wrongful death action 
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new domicile after the transaction in question occurs. 68 Moreover, 
these costs might easily be avoided through a more comprehensive 
investigation of legislative intent, one that projects into the legisla-
tive mind some sensitivity to system-coordinating values. There are 
four possible justifications for the pro-resident _bias of interest analy-
sis: an analogy to welfare, protection of state resources, the nonresi-
dent's consent to his own state's laws, and pure favoritism. 
It has been urged that restricting the benefits of forum law to 
residents is just like restricting the payment of welfare payments to 
residents. One author claims, "[A] state is interested in having its 
tort law applied to implement tlie compensatory policy reflected in 
that law in the same manner as it would be interested in applying its 
social insurance law."69 This analogy fails, however, because tort 
compensation is not state large~se; it is paid by private individuals. 70 
The funds for welfare, medical benefits, and unemployment insur-
ance are amassed from state residents, and only those who could be 
required to contribute are eligible to make claims on the available 
money. Similarly, low tuition at state universities has been limited 
to residents because only residents support state universities through 
occurs here, California's deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly advanced by ap-
plication of its own law. 
11 Cal. 3d at 583-84, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (citations omitted). While this 
reasoning has some appeal, the problems arising when concurrent regulatory interests are 
found are discussed in the text at notes 48-63 supra. 
Confusion prevailed in Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973), which applied 
Rhode Island negligence law despite the guest statute of the state where the accident occurred. 
The court found that Rhode Island had an interest in holding its citizens to its own standard of 
care, and that there was no problem of unfair surprise because "no driver alters his manner of 
driving when he crosses into a state which holds him to a lesser degree of care towards his 
passenger." 111 R.I. at 671, 306 A.2d at 817. The court should have been consistent: negli-
gence law either influences behavior, or it does not. 
68. After-acquired domicile is a difficult problem for Currie's theory, and one which is 
likely to become more frequent. See, e.g., Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., cert. granted, No. 79-938, 
48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Feb. 19, 1980); cf. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 580 (1980) (declaring uncon-
stitutional Minnesota's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over defendant; plaintiff moved to 
Minnesota after the accident that prompted the suit). 
Currie argued that a state should be able to limit application in cases of after-acquired 
domicile. See CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 620-21, 644. His explanation based upon 
"vested rights" seems peculiar in a theory decrying the metaphysics of the First Restatement. 
An interesting question is the likely effect of the durational residency requirement cases on 
after-acquired domicile should Currie's residency test be universally explained as social wel-
fare. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), held that discouraging migration into the 
state through waiting periods for welfare eligibility was an impermissible restriction on the 
right to travel. If application of state tort law is comparable to social insurance, then forum 
shopping through change of domicile might be equally protected in the conflicts setting. 
69. Sedler, supra note 32, at 192. 
70. C.f. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 442 (1943) (full faith and credit 
case, "no constitutional question would be presented if Louisiana chose to be generous to the 
employee out of the general funds in its Treasury"). 
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taxes.71 In contrast, when an interest analyst finds a compensatory 
policy in a multistate case, only in-staters are entitled to collect and 
only out-of-staters are required to pay. The result is a windfall to 
residents involved in multistate accidents: a benefit without a corre-
sponding burden. 72 
In a related vein, Currie justified his parochial view of compensa-
tory policies by suggesting that they are enacted to minimize the 
drain on state welfare funds.73 Presumably, nonresidents would 
never drain such funds.74 This rationale exemplifies a problem with 
Currie's methodology that interest analysts have never adequately 
faced. Currie seems to have been suggesting that the plaintiffs resi-
dence could be used as a proxy for other legislative concerns, such as 
the likelihood that the plaintiff would be thrown back upon public 
assistance or would default on local medical bills, thus harming the 
interests of local creditors. The domiciliary factor would, under this 
rationale, not be important in and of itself. But obviously, there will 
be some cases in which the plaintiff is wealthy enough that eventual 
recourse to welfare is unlikely. Should one nevertheless treat resi-
dence as conclusive? Or should one look beyond the plaintiffs resi-
dence to the presence or absence of these true concerns? 
Currie vacillated on this issue,75 but appeared to conclude that 
71. A state university today is an establishment with capital costs of many millions of 
dollars of investment. Its annual operating costs likewise may run into the millions. Par-
ents and other taxpayers willingly carry this heavy burden because they believe in the 
values of higher education. It is not narrow provincialism for the State to think that each 
State should carry its own educational burdens. Until we redefine our system of govern-
ment - as we are free to do by constitutionally prescribed means - the States may 
restrict subsidized education to their own residents. 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459-60 (1973) (Burger and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Since 
the majority opinion invalidated a presumption regarding out-of-state residency, it would, a 
.fortiori, have been sympathetic to the argument expressed in the text. 
72. In some cases, if application of forum law is predictable, then residents bear a burden 
which makes the benefit fair. For example, in the married women's contract cases the statute 
imposes a disability as well as a benefit, since married women will be unable to enter into such 
contracts even if they want to. There is a benefit without a burden if and only if the merchant 
is unable to distinguish which women are residents, and thus deals with all women. 
73. CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 61. Currie, of course, realized that not every plaintiff 
was on the verge of welfare, but never reconciled that fact with his asserted need for precision. 
Currie, supra note 2, at 760. 
74. However, a single accident's effect on the size of a welfare budget is insignificant. Or, 
at least, so the interest analysts have responded to arguments regarding the increased insurance 
costs of compensatory policies; they claim that the price of a single catastrophic accident is 
absorbed by the loss-spending mechanism, not passed on. CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 
724-25, 725 n. l 18 ( citing Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - T/1e /11sig11!fi-
cance o.f Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 544, 565 (1961)); see Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in t/1e Co'!flict 
o.f Laws - Towards a Theory o.f Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurance Laws" 
(pt. I), 69 YALE L.J. 595, 603 (1960). 
75. At certain points he seemed to realize that complete precision was unattainable and 
that it was not desirable to look behind the named variable even though it might be a fiction. 
CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 145; Currie, supra note 2, at 760. But in his analysis of cases 
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one should go beyond the mere fact of residence to determine 
whether the crucial variables support a state interest. This is the only 
way to account for his attitude toward liability insurance. In analyz-
ing what would have happened if Grant v. McAul!lfe had been 
brought in Arizona, Currie argued that the Arizona interest in pro-
tecting the tortfeasor's estate "evaporates completely" if the 
tortfeasor is fully insured.76 If the estate would not bear the loss, a 
court would subvert no Arizona interest whatsoever by applying the 
California survival statute.77 Thus, Currie apparently thought that 
even if the proxy seems to require application of a law (the tortfeasor 
was from Arizona, suggesting that we apply the Arizona law), we 
should look behind it to determine whether the crucial variables also 
point to that law. 
This is surely nothing like ordinary statutory construction. In 
purely domestic cases, the Arizona courts would not look to the pres-
ence of insurance to determine whether the Arizona abatement law 
should apply. While such an inquiry would be entirely consistent 
with Currie's reasoning, it is not permissible under any currently 
held theory of domestic interpretation of statutes.78 In fact, the exist-
ence of insurance is supposed to be kept as much out of the process 
of adjudication as can be arranged. 
More can be gleaned from this hypothetical variation of Grant 
than the simple observation that Currie was willing to consider fac-
tors that he would have thought illegitimate in a domestic case. We 
should also notice exactly what triggered this kind of illegitimate in-
quiry. What facts made it appropriate for Currie to take insurance 
into account in conflict cases but not in purely domestic cases? The 
he commonly cited variables not specified in the statute, ones which would presumably not be 
important in domestic cases. His treatment of Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 
944 (1953), discussed in text at note 22 sup1a, is one example. See also his evaluation of Home 
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), discussed in CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 232-33 
(Texas party was only an assignee of original contracting party and thus not entitled to appli-
cation of Texas law), and of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1931), 
discussed in CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 210-13 (deceased left no dependents, for whose 
benefit wrongful death act had been intended). 
If interest analysis relies on these "substantive" factors that would not be considered rele-
vant in domestic disputes, it runs into the problems outlined in the text. Even where it relies 
upon substantive variables that are relevant in domestic cases, it causes courts serious diffi-
culties when alluding to them as justification for applying another state's law. These are 
spelled out in the text at notes 88-97 infra. 
76. CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 159-60. 
77. Currie qualified this view only by conceding that the Arizona statute might have been 
designed to protect the insurance industry. In this unlikely event, he thought there might be an 
Arizona interest in cases involving an Arizona insurance company. Id at 160. 
78. But see Jess v. Herrmann, - Cal. 3d -, 604 P.2d 208, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1979) 
(mandatory set-off rule not applicable in comparative fault setting where parties are insured). 
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only multistate connecting factor that Currie thought an Arizona 
court should .find relevant was the tortfeasor's residence. Yet that 
could not have been the triggering factor, for in both the purely do-
mestic case and in Currie's hypothetical the tortfeasor was from Ari-
zona. No, other multistate elements in the case must have led Currie 
to perceive the dispute as a conflicts case and thus to apply this unu-
sual mode of reasoning. In particular, Currie must have perceived 
this variation of Grant (with its Arizona tortfeasor carrying Arizona 
insurance) as a conflicts case because the plaintiff was a nonresident 
plaintiff, the accident took place out of the state, or s9mething of that 
sort. Yet such elements are supposed to be formally irrelevant 
within Currie's theory. 
It is easy enough for present day. in!erest analysts to avoid such 
an embarrassing result by denying that it is ever appropriate to look 
behind the fact of residence to determine whether there are local 
creditors, whether the defendant was insured, or whether either the 
plaintiff or the defendant is likely to end his days on welfare.79 But 
if interest analysis does not look behind the domiciliary factor to 
these supposedly crucial variables, then it falls prey to the same ob-
jections Currie made to the Bealean system. It treats one crude geo-
graphical factor as talismanic. 
In effect, the interest analysts have made three incompatible 
claims for their theory: 
I) The legislative policy responsible for restricting the benefit of pro-
tective and compensatory laws to residents is a policy of avoiding dis-
sipation of state welfare resources; 
2) Interest analysis, unlike Bealean theory, allows precise case-by-
case enforcement of legislative policies; and 
3) Interest analysis is just like ordinary statutory interpretation in a 
purely domestic setting. 
As we have seen, these three claims cannot all be correct. Currie 
tried to remain faithful to the first two in his discussion of Grant but 
was left with a clear contradiction of the third. Present day analysts 
who cling to the first and third claims must abandon the key second 
79. The Supreme Court has indicated, in support of this position, that excessive particular-
ization is uncalled for. See Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955). Currie realized the 
Court's view, but never took it into account. See CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 145 n.64. 
See also Barret v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146, 1153 (1st Cir. 1971): 
Plaintiff argues that New Hampshire has a "strong legislative policy" at stake in this case 
in that the New Hampshire legislature has expressed an intention that its workmen's com-
pensation act not bar suits against tortious third parties .... Plaintiffs further assertion 
that New Hampshire law should control "because plaintiff was the sole support of five 
minor children" is not only a jury argument, but an improper one at that. We cannot 
believe that a rule of conflict of laws is to depend upon tlie affluence, vel non, of the 
parties. 
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claim. The best alternative is to renounce the first claim , and to 
search for another justification for interest analysis as a species of 
constructive intent. so 
A third defense of parochialism might be that restricting benefits 
to residents is not unfair since a nonresident should not complain of 
being held to his own state's law.81 Thus, when the state of residence 
of a defendant-driver decides not to enact a guest statute, it indicates 
a willingness to have its residents pay such claims. This justification 
raises issues of reciprocity. The nonresident is held to his state's law 
when it imposes a burden, but cannot recover under that law when 
he attempts to reap its benefits in a suit against a forum resident. It 
makes more sense to view the other legislature's decision not to enact 
a guest statute as a compromise - a regulation of the legal relation-
ship between drivers and passengers. The extra burdens a guest stat-
ute imposes on plaintiffs are justified by corresponding advantages to 
defendants and to the insurance-buying public; a given individual 
may as easily end up on the plus side as on the minus. The legisla-
ture of a state wi.thout a guest statute probably did not intend to 
burden its residents when they drive without allowing them benefits 
when they ride along. 
Interest analysis projects into multistate cases the other legisla-
ture's willingness to have its residents pay claims but fails to consider 
its own demonstrated willingn,ess to have the injured guest go un-
compensated. If interest analysis respected such a legitimate "non-
compensatory" policy, it would apply the forum guest statute and 
deny recovery. Instead, the interest analysts would have the forum 
court make a very curious sort of concession to other states: "Yes, 
we realize that you prefer to see your rule of decision applied. You 
80. These three claims might, in fact, all be incorrect. Much tort law could not have been 
designed to protect the welfare rolls since it predated welfare legislation:. Rather it reflected a 
sense of who ought to bear the cost of particular accidents. Whether one defines "ought" in 
terms of ethics or economics, compare R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LA w (2d ed. 1972) 
("ought" in terms of economics), with R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) 
("ought" in relation to the general welfare), plaintifl's residence attains no particular relevance 
as it might with a welfare rationale. In addition, "precision" is not pursued singlemindedly 
even in purely domestic cases. The very act of codification - of selecting one group of factors 
out of a large variety of possible relevant ones - entails some sacrifice of precision. See 
Powers, Formalism and Nonf'ormalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27 
(1976). See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Atfiudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976). In domestic cases this loss of precision is justified in part by increased 
predictability and ease of administration. Thus, to the extent that interest analysis downgrades 
these values, it ceases to resemble ordinary methods of interpretation. See Twerski & Mayer, 
Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice of Law Problems -Al the Inteiface of Substance and 
Procedure, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 790 (1979) (in domestic case, individualized justice 
subordinated). 
8'i. CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 720. 
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think it the best way to decide cases. Our compromise will be to 
apply the rule of decision you find appropriate in some, but not all, 
cases: exactly those cases in which your rule would work to the ad-
vantage of a resident of our state." This is obviously not much of a 
concession. As a justification for the inherent inequity in selectively 
deferring to the laws of a nonresident's home state it is disingenuous 
at best. 
A final justification for the interest analysts' belief that legisla-
tures are or should be parochial might be that such legislatures are 
predisposed to line the pockets of their constituents. From a purely 
abstract standpoint, such a predisposition is at least coherent. Per-
haps it is even plausible. It is, however, an impermissible basis for a 
conflict-of-laws theory. In commerce clause cases, the Supreme 
Court has consistently held naked preference for local commercial 
enterprise to be invidious. For example, in .Baldwin v. See/ig82 the 
Court invalidated a New York statute prohibiting the sale of milk 
for less than a fixed minimum price, even if the milk was originally 
purchased outside the state. The statute, the Court held, could not 
be justified as an economic measure designed to protect local farmers 
from competition, since such favoritism is impermissible. 83 
A conflicts methodology based only on favoritism for local resi-
dents would surely run counter to the established principles of the 
American federal system. 84 It seems directly contrary to the spirit of 
the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection 
82. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See generally Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Sug-
gested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61 (1978); Simson, .Discrimination Against No11reside11ts 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1979); Note, 
Unconstitutional .Discrimination in Choice of Law, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (1977). The extent 
to which this rationale can rely upon political underrepresentation is in doubt after Holt Civic 
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (individual residents of outlying unincorpo-
rated community do not have constitutionally guaranteed right to vote in municipal elections, 
despite municipality's power to regulate). 
83. More recent cases have reaffirmed the Baldwin result. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of 
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 
(1964) (principles of Baldwin "as sound today as they were when announced"). 
In Baldwin, New York had attempted to justify the statute as a health measure, arguing 
that the dairy farmers' health was endangered if they could not make a living. This argument 
seems curiously to anticipate the "social welfare" justification of interest analysis discussed 
immediately above. See text at notes 73-74 supra. Yet the Court rejected the argument: 
Economic welfare is always related to health . . • . Let such an exception be admitted, 
and all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and 
merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from without, lest they go 
upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether .... The Constitution was framed under 
the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. 
294 U.S. at 523 (1934). See also Simson, Stale Autonomy, supra note 82. 
84. For instance, prejudice aga.inst out-of-slaters was an original motivation for the estab-
lishment of diversity jurisdiction. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 85 (3d ed. 1973). 
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clause.85 The point is not that any statute that incidentally favors 
local residents (or any conflict-of-laws method that does likewise) is 
unconstitutional. The point is that the increased advantages for state 
residents at the expense of outsiders cannot serve as a justification. 
There must be some other legitimate rationale for the rule. 86 The 
interest analysts have yet to present one.87 
IV. ARE SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES ENOUGH? 
Underlying the analysis of governmental interests is the assump-
tion that conflict-of-laws reasoning is no different from ordinary sub-
stantive interpretation of statutes. In both cases, the job is allegedly 
to determine whether the policies behind the statute make the statu-
tory remedy appropriate. in the particular case. Therefore, it makes 
no sense to say that a law "applies" apart from the sense that its 
substantive policies "apply."88 In this Section, I will argue that there 
are two very different meanings to the word "apply," and that they 
cannot be equated, even if one is committed to Currie's theory. One 
is the domestic meaning, asking whether the statute's policies are sat-
isfied; the other is the conflicts meaning, asking whether the rule of 
decision supplied by the statute is pertinent. By analyzing examples 
taken from the section on parochialism, I hope to show that domestic 
interpretation and conflicts interpretation are different enterprises al-
together. 
The first example is based upon the guest statute cases. Currie 
argued that a state with a guest statute has an interest in applying 
that statute only in suits against a resident defendant. But what hap-
85. See Simson, Stale Autonomy, suprt1 note 82; Simson, Discrimination, supra note 82. 
Currie demonstrated some awareness of this problem. See, e.g., CURRIE ESSA vs, supra note I, 
at 619. See also note 21 supra. 
86. Many statutes provide different substantive results depending on the fact of residence. 
See Simson, State Autonomy, supra note 82; Simson, Discrimination, supra note 82. These, 
perhaps, provide the strongest support for the suggestion that legislatures would treat residents 
more favorably than nonresidents when choosing whether their law should apply. However, 
an established principle of statutory interpretation is to avoid constructions that exacerbate 
constitutional infirmities. If courts interpret state legislation on the theory that it is designed to 
benefit locals at the expense of out-of-slaters, they are choosing, instead, the most provocative 
interpretation. 
87. Perhaps at the root of the restriction of benefits to state residents is the fact that when it 
enacted protective or compensatory legislation, the legislature "had in mind" cases where a 
resident would benefit. The legislator voting for a guest statute, for example, visualizes cases 
with a resident defendant. However, this mental picture undoubtedly also featured a resfdent 
p!aint!lf - as well as an accident which occurred within the state. A too literal fidelity to what 
the legislature "had in mind" ultimately leads to the conclusion that forum law should not 
apply in cases with any multistate elements. 
88. Currie consistently argued that interest analysis was identical to substantive policy 
analysis of whether the law applied. See CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 183; Currie, supra 
note 2, at 757. 
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pens, for an interest analyst, if the state repeals its guest statute? The 
repeal is undoubtedly "for the benefit" of state residents, helping res-
ident guests to be better compensated for their injuries. Would an 
interest analyst therefore limit the repeal's application to cases where 
a resident thereby benefits? That would leave the guest statute 
standing when a nonresident guest sues a resident driver, and surely 
such a result would be absurd. Members of the Currie school would 
agree that the territorial reach of the repeal must be identical to the 
territorial reach of the original statute. But if the scope of the guest 
statute is defined in terms of benefiting residents, the repeal must 
perversely work to the residents' disadvantage.89 
More generally, interest analysis shifts the geographical reach of 
forum law as substantive law is first enacted and then repealed. The 
boundaries of forum law shift in ways that the Currie school would 
find hard to explain in terms of substantive policies alone. These 
fluctuations may be illustrated with a matrix. Since Currie felt that 
the domiciles of the two parties were the only relevant features in 
guest statute cases, only a two-by-two matrix is required.90 In the 
matrix below, which represents all two-party cases that might be 
brought in the forum's courts, the upper left rectangle represents the 
purely domestic cases; the lower right rectangle the purely foreign 
cases; the upper right rectangle the cases where the defendant is a 
resident and the plaintiff a nonresident; and the lower left rectangle 
the cases where the plaintiff is a resident and the defendant a nonres-
ident. 
Residence 
of 
Defendant C: 
., 
,::, 
-~ 
§ 
= 
Residence of Plaintiff 
resident nonresident 
domestic resident D 
cases nonresident P 
nonresident D foreign 
resident P cases 
DIAGRAM A 
89. A similar argument might be made that if a statute creates a new defense for an old 
cause of action, it probably intends that defense to apply to all cases involving the original 
cause of action, although the conclusion is less obvious than in the repeal context. The idea 
would be that it "repeals" the statute in a substantively specified group of cases, not just where 
the resident would benefit by application of the defense. This argument could be used regard-
ing guest statutes. 
90. While Currie also took forum into account in his diagrams depicting married women's 
contracts, these matrices reflect only cases in a particular forum. 
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For an interest analyst, the cases in the left half of the matrix will 
trigger any forum interest in advancing a compensatory policy, and 
those in the upper half will trigger any interest in advancing a pro-
tective policy. The domestic cases are cover~d whether compensa-
tory or protective policies are involved, and the foreign cases are not. 
These domestic and foreign cases pose no conflicts issues. 
Interests Generated 
Compensatory Policy Protective Policy 
DIAGRAM B 
Before a state enacts a guest statute, its negligence laws presuma-
bly promote a compensatory policy. Thus, over the period of time 
during which its substantive policies change, the forum law's in-
tended scope fluctuates in the following manner: 
before 
enactment 
during 
DIAGRAM C 
after repeal 
We have already seen one problem with this conception of inter-
ests: a repeal must apply to all cases previously covered by the stat-
ute, including those cases in the upper right corner of the matrix. It 
is entirely reasonable to say that the repeal has both conflicts and 
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substantive implications for the cases in the lower left comer, but 
only conflicts implications for those in the upper right comer. The 
repeal could be said to entail a lack of concern with this last group of 
cases, referring the forum court to the laws of other concerned juris-
dictions. 
But this intent to disavow any interest in that group of cases can-
not be explained in terms of benefiting forum residents, for it proba-
bly does not have that effect. Indeed, it cannot be explained as a 
substantive policy at all, for the legislature has no substantive wish 
for those cases. Rather, it resembles a traditional choice-of-law rule 
- an "odd creature" in Currie's words "which never tells us what 
the result will be but only where to find the result."91 Thus, in pass-
ing laws, a legislature necessarily makes conflicts decisions, even 
under the Currie analysis. Some laws have implications for the terri-
torial reach of forum law that cannot be explained in substantive 
terms. 
That legislatures have - indeed, must have - such unsubstan-
tive intent at times does not necessarily jeopardize any particular 
conclusions Currie might have reached about when a forum should 
apply its own law; rather, in this instance, it derives from them. But 
while this particular nonsubstantive intent is not threatening, gener-
alized searching for nonsubstantive intentions regarding a statute's 
scope might lead a court to different conclusions than Currie's meth-
odology would dictate. A court might, for instance, discern a legisla-
tive intent that the law of the place of wrong should govern, 
therefore refusing to apply forum law even though interest analysis 
would d_eem the law's substantive policies satisfied. Or it might use 
forum law to settle cases that did not fulfill Currie's interpretation of 
the statute's substantive policy. Currie found this last possibility ab-
surd, insisting that a law "applied" if and only if the substantive pol-
icies underlying it applied.92 
Currie was demonstrably mistaken on this point. His attempts to 
treat geographical connecting factors in exactly the same way that 
ordinary domestic factors are treated were doomed to failure. Ap-
parently, the idea was that for any particular statute, some geograph-
ical connecting factors would be relevant and some would not, just 
as some facts that might be found in local cases are relevant and 
91. CURRIE EssAYS, supra note I, at 170. Compare also his remark that "a choice-of-law 
rule is an empty and bloodless thing. Actually, instead of declaring an overriding public pol-
icy, it proclaims the state's indifference to the result of the litigation." Id. at 53. 
92. For instance, he derided the public policy exception because it provided "a basis for 
not applying the 'applicable' law." CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 181, 212, 736. 
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some are not. In both domestic and conflicts cases, the court's job is 
supposedly to identify the necessary preconditions for the result 
specified in the statute. In a domestic guest-statute case, a court 
might have to decide whether it was relevant that compensation was 
offered and thus whether failure to pay was a prerequisite for appli-
cation of the guest statute.93 Similarly, iµ a multistate case, Currie 
would have the court consult the underlying policies to determine 
whether it was relevant that the accident occurred in another state. 
In Currie's view, the substantive and conflicts prerequisites for using 
the guest statute to require a showing of reckless misconduct were 
not qualitatively different. 
The fallacy in this idea can be illustrated by classifying cases ac-
cording to three criteria: a) whether the relevant substantive precon-
ditions for domestic law are satisfied, b) whether the supposedly 
relevant conflicts preconditions for domestic law are satisfied, and c) 
whether there are any other elements that link the case with a foreign 
state but that Currie would have declared irrelevant. Con~ider a 
case where the substantive criteria are satisfied, the conflicts criteria 
are not satisfied, and there are no other multistate connecting factors 
in the case. Does the forum legislature intend its law to apply? 
It seems the interest analysts would say that forum law should 
not apply. The crucial conflicts test has not been met. The fact that 
all other connecting factors point toward domestic law is by hypoth-
esis irrelevant. Interest analysts would presumably also say that this 
case is indistinguishable from one where the substantive test is satis-
fied, the conflicts test is not satisfied, and all the "irrelevant" con-
necting factors point toward the other state's law. The reason is 
precisely that other connecting factors are supposed to be irrelevant. 
To express this point diagramatically, the argument is that cases (1) 
and (2) are equivalent: 
substantive test 
(I) satisfied 
(2) satisfied 
· conflicts test 
foreign 
foreign 
irrelevant 
connecting factors 
all foreign 
all _domestic . 
But the interest analysts claim that conflicts preconditions are just 
like substantive preconditions. Since there is no difference between 
the two sorts of variables, a failure to satisfy one should have the 
same result as a failure to satisfy the other.94 Therefore, cases (2) 
93. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 382-85 (4th ed. 1971). 
94. See, e.g., Currie's treatment of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 
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and (3) are identical: 
substantive test 
(2) satisfied 
(3) not satisfied 
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conflic~ test 
foreign 
domestic 
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irrelevant 
connecting factors 
all domestic 
all domestic 
However, if (1) and (2) are identical, and (2) and (3) are identical, 
then so are (1) and (3). Yet (1) is a foreign case, with no domestic 
aspects at all, and (3) is a domestic case, with no multistate elements. 
Surely, if there is anything that all conflict-of-laws theorists would 
agree upon, it is that the legislature intends its law to apply to (3) and 
not to (1).95 · 
The problem that leads to this paradox is the assumption that 
conflicts preconditions are just like substantive preconditions, that is, 
that case (2) is identical to case (3). This assumption leads the inter-
est analysts to conclude that a case's failure to meet a statute's sub-
stantive preconditions will keep the state from finding an interest, 
presumably even if the "crucial" conflicts variable points toward fo-
rum law. In cases with other multistate features, that conclusion is 
difficult to refute since we have no clear evidence about legislative 
intent; but in a purely domestic case, it is clearly false. Moreover, 
the only factors that the interest analysts might employ to distinguish 
between those two classes of cases are multistate features that are 
supposed to be irrelevant.96 If we assume that those features are in-
deed irrelevant, then we must abandon the prior assumption that 
conflicts preconditions are just like substantive preconditions. 
In truth, there is no reason why substantive requirements should 
be like conflicts requirements. Failure to satisfy the substantive re-
quirements of forum law does not in domestic cases provide a reason 
for turning to the law of another state; nor does it mean that the 
forum no longer wants to use its own rule of decision. The paradox 
outlined above arises because the interest analysts have lumped to-
(1932), in which he concluded that New Hampshire had no interest and Vermont law should 
apply because the substantive preconditions for application of the wrongful death statute were 
not satisfied. CURRIE EssAYS, supra note l, at 210. 
95. In precisely the same way, it can be demonstrated that a fourth case: substantive test, 
not satisfied; conflicts test, domestic; irrelevant connecting factors, all foreign; is equivalent to 
both (1) and (3). 
96. This anomaly is similar to the problem that arose from Currie's treatment of insurance. 
See text at notes 76-77 supra. In cases with a variety of multistate elements, Currie asserted 
that facts such as the existence of insurance might be relevant to the satisfaction of substantive 
criteria, and thus defeat an interest based on a defendant's residence. Yet in purely domestic 
cases courts would never consider insurance. 
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gether two different uses of the word "applies." They argue that if a 
conflicts prerequisite is not met, the statute fails to apply in the same 
sense as when a substantive prerequisite is not met., But in a purely 
domestic case, domestic law "applies" under any conflict oflaws the-
ory; the word means that domestic law supplies the pertinent rule of 
decision. Once we "apply" that law, however, the issue may go ei-
ther way, depending upon whether the substantive preconditions are 
satisfied. In the conflicts-of-laws sense, a domestic guest statute "ap-
plies" to all domestic accidents; but in the substantive sense of 
prohibiting recovery, it "applies" in only some of those cases, 
namely those in which the driver was not compensated. To say that 
a standard applies may mean either that it is pertinent, or that it is 
satisfied. 
Interest analysts have attended only to the latter use of the word. 
Yet a single meaning is necessarily insufficient. At least three differ-
ent situations require different treatment: the purely domestic case 
with all substantive preconditions satisfied, the purely domestic case 
with some deficiency in the substantive preconditions, and the purely 
foreign case. To insist on only one meaning, and therefore only one 
test, forces cases in the middle category to be treated as falling into 
either the first group or the third group. But they are not identical to 
the first, since they require a different substantive outcome. Nor 
should they be equated with the third group, since purely domestic 
cases call for domestic law and purely foreign cases call for foreign 
law. A two-step inquiry about the pertinence of the standard and 
then about whether it is satisfied, would give cases in the middle 
group the special treatment they deserve. If forum law is pertinent, 
the second step is to apply it, thus dividing the group to which the 
forum law applies into two more groups: those that satisfy the stan-
dard and those that do not. 
Courts resolve problems involving both state and federal law by 
psing this same two-stage process. The decision about whether fed-
eral law supplies the rule of decision is independent from and prior 
to the decision about what substantive result is appropriate.97 This 
method is particularly clear where a federal question is the only ba-
sis for subject matter jurisdiction; the jurisdictional issue is decided 
before the substantive issue. A subsequent finding that the federal 
law's substantive purposes do not mandate recovery does not make 
that law any less dispositive; the court need not then tum to state law 
or dismiss for want of jurisdiction. 
97. C.f. Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (court made its 
conflict-of-laws decision before passing on the merits of a disputed substantive issue). 
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V. ACTUAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT REVISITED: A GLANCE AT 
SELECTED STATUTES 
The traditional methodology aspired to predictability, simplicity, 
and evenhandedness. The interest analysts claim that these methods 
risked sacrificing substantive policy goals in the process. Interest 
analysis, in contrast, allows parochial, unpredictable, and chaotic re-
sults. Nonetheless, the interest analysts argue, the results are at least 
faithful to legislative wishes. And Currie's confidence that state leg-
islatures would agree with him was remarkable. At one point he 
wrote: 
[There] is [a] growing tendency of legislators to specify how their en-
actments are intended to affect mixed cases. The task of drafting such 
provisions forces attention to the interests and objectives involved. A 
legislature is not likely to append to any statute dealing with a spec!ftc 
problem any such rule as that the law of the place where the contract is 
made shall control.98 
Even a casual glance at choice-of-law statutes shows that he was 
wrong. Existing choice-of-law statutes demonstrate that simplicity, 
predictability, and multistate harmony motivate state legislatures 
just as they have motivated all conflicts theorists except the interest 
analysts.99 Indeed, given the two senses of the word "applies," this is 
entirely sensible. In enacting a substantive statute, the legislature 
considers the competing substantive claims on both sides and strikes 
a balance. In drafting a conflicts provision to accompany it, the leg-
islature must choose between making its own standards pertinent or 
referring to the law of other states. Again, a balance must be struck: 
but the substantive values were already accommodated in the first 
decision. The other decision - about when to make the statute per-
tinent - reflects values such as comity and predictability. 
In the statutes cited below, explicit legislative adoption of the 
Currie school methods seems to be lacking. Almost wholly absent, 
for example, is support for the premise that compensatory and pro-
tective policies are designed to benefit only forum residents. If Cur-
rie's inferences about legislative intent were correct, this premise 
would be reflected in two ways. First, statutes motivated solely by a 
protective or compensatory policy would limit their own scope to 
cases where the forum rule would benefit a resident. Second, when 
98. CURRIE EssAYS, supra note l, at ll6 (emphasis added). q: id. at 703: "In any realistic 
setting . . . , we are likely to find that the concern of the state is with the people involved 
rather than the s_cene of the activity." 
99. For a survey and discussion of choice-of-law statutes, see W. REESE & M. RoSENDERO, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 553-56 (7th ed. 1978); Leflar, supra note 3. 
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such policies were conjoined with regulatory policies in a single stat-
ute, they would supply an alternative ground for its application. 
Instead, a search through conflict-of-laws statutes reveals mostly 
Bealean conflicts rules. We find statutes that make the rule of lex 
loci govern the permissible interest on loans, 100 statutes that make 
forum law apply to all torts or crimes committed in airplanes over 
forum territory, 101 and statutes that make the law of the place of 
execution or performance govern interpretation of wills. 102 None of 
these statutes is phrased in terms of benefiting forum residents, al-
though many serve protective or compensatory purposes. The effect 
on forum residents is never mentioned as either .a sole or an alterna-
tive basis for applying forum law. Other conflict-of-laws statutes es-
tablish the relevance of different geographical factors, but also in the 
style of traditional conflicts rules: certain securities problems are to 
be decided according to the law of the issuer's residence, 103 mergers 
are controlled by the law of the state where the survivor is incorpo-
rated, 104 and bank deposits are governed by the law of the bank's 
100. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 57-106 (Harrison 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 438.154 
(1970); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 45-158 (1978). 
IOI. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 28-1704 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 259.177 (1970); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-16 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1470 (Purdon 1963). · 
102. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 14-2506 (1975), 14-2602 (Supp. 1979); CAL. C1v. CODE 
§ 1646 (West 1973); CAL. c,v. PROC. CooE § 1857 (West 1955); CAL. PROB. CODE§ 26 (Deer-
ing 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1306 (Supp. 1978); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (West 
1952); LA. CODE C1v. PRO. ANN. art. 2888 (West 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 191, § IA 
(Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.133 (West Supp. 1979). 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2340 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-06, -09-02 (1976); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 112.230, .255 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 53-1-4 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 853.05 (West 1977). 
103. See ALA. CODE § 7-8-106 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3006 (1967); ARK. 
STAT. ANN.§ 85-8-106 (1961); CAL. COM. CODE§ 8106 (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 4-8-
106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 42a-8-106 (West 1960); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 8-106 (1974); 
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 678.8 -106 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 8-106 (Smith-Hurd 1974); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.8106 (West 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-8-106 (1965); KY. REV. 
STAT.§ 355.8-106 (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 8-106 (1964); Mo. CoM. LAW. CODE 
ANN.§ 8-106 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 8-106 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1976); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS§ 440.8106 (1970); MINN. STAT.§ 336.8-106 (West 1974); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 75-
8-106 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.8-106 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87a-8-106 
(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 8-106 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 104.8106 (1973); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 382A:8-106 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 55-8-106 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 25-
8-106 (1965); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 1308.05 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12a, § 8-
106 (West 1963); OR. REV. STAT.§ 78.1060 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-106 (Purdon 
1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-8-106 (1969); S.C. CODE § 36-8-106 (1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.§ 57-31-19 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 47-8-106 (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 
tit. I,§ 8.106 (Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 70A-8-106 (1979); VA. CODE§ 8.8-106 
(1965); WASH. REv. CoDE § 62A.8-106 (1966); W. VA. CODE§ 46-8-106 (1966); Wis. STAT. 
§ 408.106 (1977); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 34-21-806 (1977). 
104. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.408 (1968); CAL. CORP. CODE§ I 108 (West 1977); CoLO. 
REV. STAT.§ 7-7-107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-482 {1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13-B, § 906 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 78.475 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-14-7 (1978); 
N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 908 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-42.I 
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location.105 
Even when a conflict-of-laws statute relies on a party's residence, 
we do not find the parochialism Currie anticipated. Connecticut de-
termines the status of children born after artificial insemination by 
the law of the place of birth, but it apparently does not matter 
whether the child would be helped or harmed by Connecticut law on 
the subject.106 The Uniform Probate Code determines spousal elec-
tive share by reference to the law of the parties' residence, but appar-
ently either a resident or a nonresident may invoke that law, 
whoever would benefit by having it applied. 107 
We also find the familiar "alternative reference" rules, which up-
hold wills or contracts if they would be valid under the law of any 
one of several states ( state of making, state of execution, etc. ). 108 No 
doubt legislatures adopt these rules to vindicate reasonable expecta-
tions. But once again, they make no mention of who will benefit 
under any of the laws in question. 109 A number of conflicts statutes 
(1975); OHIO REV. CooE ANN.§ 1701.79 (Page 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 459a (Purdon 
1971); TEX. Bus. CORP. CODE ANN. art. 5.07 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-72 
(1953); VA. CODE§ 13.1-71 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE§ 23A.20.070 (1969); W. VA. CODE 
§ 31-1-38 (1975); Wis. STAT.§ 180.68 (1977); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-406 (1977). 
105. See ALA. CODE § 7-4-102 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2602 (1967); ARK. 
STAT. ANN.§ 85-4-102 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4-102 (1974) (Delaware annotations to 
this provision cite the Restatement with approval); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 674.4-102 (1966); ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 4-102 (1963); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 554.4102 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 84-
4-102 (1965); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10:4-102 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 4-102 (1964); Mo. COM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 4-102 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 4-102 
(Michie/Law Co-op 1976); MINN. STAT. § 336.4-102 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-4-102 
(1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.4-102 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87A-4-102 (1947); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-102 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.4102 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, 
§ 382-A:4-102 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 55-4-102 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 25-4-102 (1975); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1304.02 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 4-102 (1963); OR. 
REV. STAT.§ 74.1020 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 4-102 (Purdon 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 6A-4-102 (1969); s.c. CODE§ 36-4-102 (1976); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4.102 
(Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-4-102 (1953); VA. CODE §8.4-102 (1950); WASH, 
REV. CODE§ 62A.4-102 (1966); W. VA. CODE§ 46-4-102 (1966); Wis. STAT.§ 404.102 (1977); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-21-402 (1977). 
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 45-69k (West Supp. 1979). 
107. See N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-05-01 (1976); accord, 20 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN,§ 2203 
(Purdon Supp. 1979). 
108. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 14-2506, 25~112 (1975); CAL. C1v. CODE§ 63 (West 
1954); CAL. PROB. CODE§ 26 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1306 (1975); 
IDAHO CODE§ 32-203 (1963); LA. CODE C1v. PRO. ANN. art. 2888 (West 1961); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 14-03-08, 30.1-08-06 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.225 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN, 
§ 30-1-4 (1976); Wis. STAT.§ 853.05 (1977). 
109 . .But see the discussion of borrowing statutes in notes 113-16 i,!fra and accompanyii,g 
text. Some examples of statutes that do not mention who will benefit include: 
Rules that real property may be governed by the law of the situs. CAL. CIV. CODE § 755 
(West 1954); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-04-01 (1978); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 43-1-6 (1967). 
Rules that personal property may be governed by the law of domicile. CAL. CIV. CODE 
January 1980] Interest Analysis 427 
explicitly mention the "conflicts rules" of other jurisdictions, 110 thus 
approving renvoi, a practice Currie found irrational. 111 Legislatures 
also typically define personal jurisdiction by facts such as location of 
the accident, 112 finding that factor relevant to whether the state has 
an interest in adjudicating the case. Statutes of limitation also define 
willingness to adjudicate by whether the cause of action arose within 
the state. Where will such irrationality stop? 
Perhaps the only example of a statute reflecting Currie's views is 
the borrowing statute, which allows residents but not nonresidents to 
take advantage of a forum statute of limitations that is longer than 
the statute that would otherwise apply. 113 However, borrowing stat-
utes are intended primarily to prevent forum shopping, a goal the 
Currie school does not consider important.114 If there were no such 
provision, many courts would always apply the forum statute of lim-
itations 115 and this might draw litigants to a forum with a long stat-
ute. The borrowing statute prevents forum shopping but allows 
forum law to apply when there is no danger - when the cause of 
action accrued in the forum or the plaintiff is a resident. 116 
§ 946 (West 1954); IDAHO CODE§ 55-401 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-07-01 (1978); S.D. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-1-7 {1967). 
Rules that marital property may be governed by the law of the state where acquired. ARIZ: 
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-217 {1976). 
I 10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 44-3006 (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 42a-8-106 (West 
1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-106 (1975); see statutes cited in note 103 supra. 
111. CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 184. 
112. Other factors, of course, include residence of the defendant, place of incorporation, 
place of doing business, etc. 
113. There are, of course, many statutes which tum on the residence of one party in the 
substantive sense. See generally Simson, State Autonomy, note 82 supra; Simson, .Discrimina-
tion, note 82 supra. Such, for instance, are those tolling statutes that specify that the statute of 
limitations shall not run in favor of nonresidents. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.13 (West 
Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:14-22 (West 1952); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 98 (West 
Supp. 1979); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5532 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-18 
(1970); W. VA. CODE§ 55-2-17 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 893.30 (1974). These are not, how-
ever, conflicts statutes since the statutes supply rules of decision regardless of the parties' resi-
dence. The statute of limitations does not apply in the substantive sense with regard to 
nonresidents (because it is tolled), but it does apply in the conflicts sense, because the court 
does not conclude that there is no interest and then tum to foreign law. As indicated in the 
accompanying text, this last result has been changed in some states by borrowing statutes; but 
tolling statutes are not by themselves an exception to the general principle. But see note 86 
supra and accompanying text. 
114. The purpose of avoiding forum shopping is demonstrated by the common proviso 
that the resident must have held the· cause of action since it accrued. See CAL. C1v. PROC. 
CODE§ 361 (West 1954); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-516 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 25-215 (1975); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 {1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1953); WIS. STAT. § 893.205 
(1977); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1973); LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 3547 (West 1953); OR. 
REV. STAT.§ 12.260 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE§ 4.16.290 (1974) (all barring two nonresidents 
who are injured out of state from using this forum's statute of limitation). 
115. Leflar, supra note 3, at 960. 
I 16. Such borrowing statutes were held constitutional in Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 
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Interest analysts might off er three explanations for the dearth of 
statutes re.fleeting their views. First, they might suggest that these 
statutes shed no light on what should be done in the absence of a 
statute, the problem with which Currie primarily concerned himself. 
They might grant the significance of these laws in the situations ex-
plicitly covered, but refuse to extend them by analogy. This re-
sponse would undercut somewhat their pretensions to "ordinary 
statutory interpretation," for ordinary statutory interpretation takes 
advantage of available analogies. Moreover, these statutes demon-
strate serious legislative concern with system values, such as predict-
ability and uniformity, in multistate cases. 
Perhaps most disturbingly, the Currie school asks us to draw a 
strange inference from legislative silence. Many substantive statutes 
were enacted before interest analysis was popular, against a pre-
sumption that the applicable rule was "lex loci."117 When conflicts 
statutes were formulated, they codified that Bealean principle by and 
large, adapting it where appropriate to re.fleet new connecting vari-
ables, such as place of incorporation for the law of mergers. It seems 
odd to assume that the legislature intended implicitly to change 
whatever was not codified and wanted the change to re.fleet govern-
mental interest. A somewhat more plausible explanation would be 
that the legislatures left to the wisdom of the courts the decision 
whether to modify any uncodified territorialist conflicts rules. Even 
that position is troublesome when used to justify a theory that 
stresses strict obedience to legislative intent. The most sensible de-
duction from legislative silence is that the legislature expected every-
thing it took for granted at the time of enactment to remain 
unchanged. 
The second response to the preponderance of Bealean statutes is 
that legislatures have simply been blinded by territorialist dogma. 
Many conflict-of-laws statutes are, after all, state-adopted uniform 
legislation; the drafters of such legislation are undoubtedly pecu-
U.S. 553 (1920). While holding only that the shorter statute of limitations was reasonable, the 
Court also noted that the plaintiff's sole purpose for selecting the forum was to take advantage 
of the longer period. 252 U.S. at 563. 
117. Historically, it is most probable that legislatures contemplated territorial approaches 
to conflicts problems. Courts have recognized this legislative predilection when declining to 
adopt "modem" approaches. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965); 
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). After Marmon, the Texas legisla-
ture acted to permit application of whichever substantive law the courts think appropriate. 
TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671, 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). Texas courts subse-
quently rejected lex loci and adopted the approach of the Second Restatement in a case that 
arose between Marmon and the revision of the statute, on the theory that the old statute did 
not apply to co=on-law causes of action, and that the new theories were virtually inter-
changeable. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). 
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liarly susceptible to the charms of predictability and interstate har-
mony.118 This explanation of statutory conflicts rules may be 
accurate. Even if it is, however, it is not an argument that can be 
addressed to courts by adherents of a "mine i~ not to reason why" 
approach to conflicts. Unless the interest analysts are able to con-
vince state legislators to cast off such "outmoded" and "overly altru-
istic" inclinations, their hands are tied. 
A third explanation is that these apparently territorialist statutes 
are really entirely consistent with interest analysis. Most of the pro-
visions that refer to the location of activity - such as the one requir-
ing the law of a bank's location to control bank deposits - can be 
termed "regulatory,"'making it natural to apply the law of the place 
where the conduct occurs. But this solution involves an important 
concession to the traditionalist perspective; it means abandoning 
concqrrent "protective" or "compensatory" policies, and focusing 
solely on territorial connecting factors. The residence of one party 
can no longer trigger application of forum law, aml interest analysis 
is thereby made more predictable (as well it should be, especially in 
matters of commercial law). In short, analysis of governmental in-
terests is made consistent with existing manifestations of legislative 
intent by rejecting one of the characteristics that distinguish it from 
traditional analysis: the premise that residents receive favored treat-
ment. · 
CONCLUSION 
I have adduced a fair number of instances in which principles of 
interest analysis are contrary to the expressed or reasonably imputed 
wishes of legislatures. Perhaps this only pushes back the scope of 
interest analysis to cases where absolutely no legislative intent is de-
monstrable; perhaps it can still be argued that Currie's principles 
govern there. This tactic preserves the appearance of consistency 
with legislative intent, but only by retreating from cases that off er 
evidence on the question. Moreover, the situations where the inter-
est analysts' imputations of intent are most convincing are precisely 
those where interest analysis and traditional approaches agree. Cur-
rie's most persuasive argument about legislative intent was that a 
New York rule of the road is not intended to have any application to 
Saudi Arabia, "but is designed solely to regulate traffic on the streets 
I 18. Currie typed traditionalists as "probably among the strong advocates of uniform state 
laws." CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 708. He also expressed concern that drafters of uni- -
form legislation or interstate compacts would be influenced by settled conflict-of-laws doctrine. 
Id at 190 n.5. But see note 63 supra. 
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and highways of New York." 119 
Perhaps by tinkering with the calculus of interest it will be possi-
ble to avoid some of the other problems set out in this Article. At a 
certain point, however, the excessive complexity of a system may 
cause it to collapse. The Bealean system accommodated itself to 
larger and larger numbers of more and more serious counter-exam-
ples until eventually it was no longer convincing or even intelligible. 
Interest analysts can hardly cite methodological sponginess, enabling 
courts to circumvent their method's absurd results, as one of the 
methodology's virtues. 12° Currie was quick to make the analogous 
point when criticizing the First Restatement. 121 
Some may think that this is not tinkering at all, that it is honest 
development of a single principle: a court should follow legislative 
intent, and if there is no actual intent, then the court should turn to 
constructive intent. Interest analysts could then accept this Article's 
criticisms as a tool to hone their methods. This may even be accept-
able, so long as they realize that their talk about "intent" is a fiction 
and their premises are metaphysical. 
It should not be surprising that a theoretical approach to "con-
structive intent" reflects the value preferences of the theoretician. 
Where there is no objective evidence, one falls back to one's own 
conception of the best arrangement. This is particularly likely in 
conflict-of-laws cases, where evidence of actual legislative intent is 
rare. Thus in reasoning about conflicts problems, scholars and 
courts can and should heed some of the values that interest analysts 
condemned as "metaphysical," such as evenhandedness and predict-
ability. In doing so, a court would not disregard its duty to follow 
the commands of its legislature. Legislatures, like conflicts theorists, 
have frequently concerned them~elves with systems values. And this 
is entirely appropriate; respect for these values may benefit residents 
as well as nonresidents. 
When a legislature has not indicated the territorial scope of a 
Il9. CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note I, at 58. 
120. Currie did not dispute the method's considerable flexibility: 
To one of Mr. Hill's charges I plead guilty without reservation. In the first sentence of 
his essay he attributes to me the proposal that traditional methods of choice of law be 
abandoned in favor of a method "involving the effectuation of relevant governmental 
policies on what appears to be an ad hoc basis." "Ad hoc" has a deprecatory connotation 
that was no doubt intended. But the method I advocate is the method of statutory con-
struction, and of interpretation of common-law rules, to determine their applicability to 
mixed cases .... The distinctive virtue of the common-law system is that it also proceeds 
on an ad hoc basis. I am proud to associate myself with the common-law tradition. 
CURRIE EsSAYS, supra note I, at 627. 
121. Id. at 181. 
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statute in either the words enacted or in the legislative history, it is a 
fiction to speak of "legislative intent." If my analysis of what the 
calculus of interests requires is erroneous, the interest analysts 
should clarify the a priori principles upon which their theory neces-
sarily rests. Even better, they would do well to cease making extrav-
agant claims about fulfilling legislators' wishes, and get to work on a 
theory of constructive interpretation that at least comports with 
demonstrated legislative concerns. 
